HI6025 Accounting Theory and Current Issues: Group Assignment
Unit and Assessment Context
Holmes Institute Higher Education runs HI6025 Accounting Theory and Current Issues as a core unit of the Master of Professional Accounting, and the Group Assignment inside HI6025 carries 40 per cent of the unit mark. Delivery spans the Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Gold Coast campuses across a three trimester year, which shortens the research window and forces groups to settle their company choice early. Teaching moves from the Australian external reporting environment and the Conceptual Framework through theories of financial accounting to the specific standards on revaluations, intangibles, leases and employee benefits. The assignment asks a group to take one ASX listed company and read its annual report as evidence of managerial incentives rather than as a set of numbers. Assessment weight sits at 40 per cent of the total, the report runs to 3,000 words with a 500 word tolerance, and the marking rewards critical analysis over description at every level.
Assessment Snapshot
| Institution | Holmes Institute Higher Education, Faculty of Higher Education |
|---|---|
| Unit code and title | HI6025 Accounting Theory and Current Issues |
| Program and level | Master of Professional Accounting, postgraduate |
| Study period | Trimester offering, with campuses at Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Gold Coast |
| Assessment type | Group Assignment, written report |
| Weight | 40 per cent of the total assessment for the unit |
| Word limit | 3,000 words, plus or minus 500 words, with the word count declared on the cover page |
| Marks allocation | Part A 25 marks, Part B 12 marks, overall presentation 3 marks, total 40 marks |
| Company selection | One ASX listed company, registered with the campus lecturer by Week 9, with a 10 per cent deduction for groups that do not register |
| Source requirement | At least three academic journal articles in Part A, at least two in Part B, all published from 2010 onwards |
| Referencing | Holmes Institute Adapted Harvard, numbered reference list with a hyperlink to the full text of each source |
| Submission | Microsoft Word through Blackboard, with a completed Assessment Cover Page |
Assessment Task
Complete both parts of the report on the one company allocated to your group. Every claim about the company’s pay structure or its disclosures must trace back to a page of the annual report, and every theoretical claim must trace back to a journal article published from 2010 onwards. Groups that write about accounting theory in the abstract without anchoring it to the allocated company lose the marks that matter most.
Part A: Executive Remuneration and Positive Accounting Theory
Obtain the latest annual report of the allocated company, using the 2025 report or the 2024 report only where 2025 is not yet available.
- Identify and explain the components of the executive remuneration package, covering fixed remuneration, short term incentives and long term incentives, with the performance measures attached to each. Present the material in a table and reference the Remuneration Report for every component. This section carries 6 marks.
- Evaluate how the identified structure may shape managerial behaviour by applying the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt covenant hypothesis and the political cost hypothesis. Link specific components, such as short term incentive weights or earnings based targets, to specific accounting choices or to earnings management behaviour. Support the argument with at least three academic journal articles. This section carries 14 marks.
- Assess whether the structure aligns managers with shareholders or invites opportunistic behaviour, then propose two realistic recommendations supported by literature. This section carries 5 marks.
Part B: Professional Judgement in Accounting Standards
Answer the statement that professional judgement plays a central role in the application of accounting standards, with reference to any two of AASB 116 Property, Plant and Equipment, AASB 138 Intangible Assets, AASB 119 Employee Benefits and AASB 16 Leases.
- Select two disclosures, one for each chosen standard, where judgement is applied. Explain each disclosure and attach clearly labelled screenshots of the relevant note to the financial statements. This section carries 4 marks.
- Evaluate whether the disclosures give stakeholders enough transparency to understand the judgements being made, using specific examples. This section carries 4 marks.
- State clearly whether you agree or disagree with the statement and justify the position through your analysis, the standards themselves and two academic articles published from 2010 onwards. This section carries 4 marks.
Reporting Requirements and Penalties
- Attach the completed Assessment Cover Page. Submissions without a cover page incur a 20 per cent penalty.
- Submit in Microsoft Word. Other file formats incur a 20 per cent penalty.
- Submit as a group. A solo submission inside a group assessment incurs a 20 per cent penalty.
- Submit from a campus network or a normal connection. Submissions through a virtual private network incur a 50 per cent penalty, and submissions from an overseas IP address are reported under the Student Academic Conduct and Integrity Policy.
- Use the Holmes Institute Adapted Harvard Referencing method. Incorrect referencing or missing citations incur a 20 per cent penalty.
- Register the allocated company with the lecturer by Week 9. Groups that skip registration lose 10 per cent.
- Accept the late submission penalty set out in the Student Handbook unless an extension or special consideration is approved before the deadline.
Report Structure
- Assessment Cover Page with group member names, student numbers and the declared word count.
- Executive summary of roughly 200 words stating the company, the two arguments and the two recommendations.
- Table of contents.
- Short introduction framing the report against the two parts.
- Part A section, built from the remuneration table, the theory evaluation and the recommendations.
- Part B section, built from the two judgement disclosures, the transparency evaluation and the stated position.
- Conclusion that answers both parts without repeating the executive summary.
- Reference list in Holmes Adapted Harvard format, numbered, alphabetical and hyperlinked.
Marking Rubric
Part A: 25 Marks
| Criterion | Excellent | Very Good | Good | Satisfactory | Unsatisfactory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identification of remuneration structure, 6 marks | All components identified with clear explanation, performance measures well integrated, strong evidence from the Remuneration Report | Clear identification and explanation with sound evidence, minor omissions | Adequate identification, explanation largely descriptive, limited integration of performance measures | Basic identification with minimal explanation, weak structure | Incomplete or incorrect identification, little supporting evidence |
| Evaluation using Positive Accounting Theory, 14 marks | Critical evaluation across all three hypotheses, strong linkage between incentives and managerial behaviour, insightful analysis | Sound application of theory with clear links, minor gaps in depth | Adequate application, some analysis but partly descriptive | Basic understanding with weak or unclear application | Poor or incorrect application, no meaningful analysis |
| Overall evaluation, conclusion and recommendations, 5 marks | Strong evaluation with a justified conclusion, recommendations realistic and literature backed | Sound evaluation and conclusion, recommendations supported but less insightful | Adequate evaluation, recommendations general with limited support | Limited evaluation and weak recommendations | Little or no evaluation, no meaningful recommendations |
Part B: 12 Marks
| Criterion | Excellent | Very Good | Good | Satisfactory | Unsatisfactory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Professional judgement disclosures, 4 marks | Two relevant disclosures accurately identified and explained, screenshots well labelled and effectively integrated | Sound identification and explanation, screenshots included with minor issues | Adequate identification, explanation lacks depth, screenshots not well integrated | Limited explanation and weak use of screenshots | Incorrect or missing disclosures, no meaningful evidence |
| Evaluation of transparency, 4 marks | Insightful evaluation with strong examples and critical understanding | Sound evaluation with relevant examples | Basic evaluation with limited critical insight | Minimal evaluation, largely descriptive | No meaningful evaluation |
| Conclusion and justification, 4 marks | Clear position, strong integration of analysis, standards and at least two articles from 2010 onwards | Clear position with good justification and literature use | Position stated with limited justification or weak source integration | Unclear position with minimal support | No clear position or supporting evidence |
Overall Presentation: 3 Marks
| Excellent | Excellent structure, clarity, formatting and referencing throughout |
|---|---|
| Very Good | Well presented with minor issues |
| Good | Adequate presentation with some formatting issues |
| Satisfactory | Poor structure or inconsistent referencing |
| Unsatisfactory | Very poor presentation, difficult to follow |
Assumptions and Verification Notes
The specification above follows the most recent publicly verifiable version of this brief, released for Trimester 1 2026, which sets the weight at 40 per cent, the length at 3,000 words plus or minus 500, and the marks at 25 for Part A, 12 for Part B and 3 for presentation. Earlier offerings differed in ways a student should know about, since the same task ran at 30 per cent with a straight 3,000 word limit in 2019 and at 40 per cent with a Conceptual and critical evaluation title in 2021. The Part A topic on executive remuneration and Positive Accounting Theory appeared from 2025 onward, so any sample circulating under the older IFRS adoption title no longer matches the current question. Confirm three things on Blackboard before drafting, namely the operative weight for your trimester, the exact due date and time, and the group size rule for your campus. One further caution applies to the shared database credentials that appear in copied versions of this paper, because library access should run through the Holmes student login page and not through a password circulated on the open web.
Academic Integrity
Holmes Institute groups breaches into plagiarism, collusion, copying, impersonation, contract cheating, and data fabrication or falsification. The brief itself warns against submitting generative output as your own work, and the 20 per cent penalty for referencing failures catches most of the cases that arise. Fabricating a screenshot of a financial statement note is the most serious error available in this task, because a marker who opens the linked annual report will find the page does not exist. Every screenshot needs a figure number, a note reference and a page citation so that it can be checked. Group work also creates a specific risk, since four students drafting four sections with four voices produces a report whose referencing is inconsistent by construction. Assign one member to run the final reference check against the annual report before submission.
References and Learning Materials
Al-Faryan, M.A.S. (2024) ‘Agency theory, corporate governance and corruption: an integrative literature review approach’, Cogent Social Sciences, 10(1), 2337893. doi:10.1080/23311886.2024.2337893
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board and Australian Accounting Standards Board (2022) AASB Research Report No. 17: Transition Relief and Ongoing Practical Expedients in IFRS 16 Leases. Melbourne: AASB. Available at: https://www.aasb.gov.au/research-resources/research-centre/research-reports/
Australian Accounting Standards Board (2015) AASB 116 Property, Plant and Equipment. Melbourne: AASB. Available at: https://www.aasb.gov.au
Bui, T.H. (2024) ‘Past, present, and future of earnings management research’, Cogent Business and Management, 11(1), 2300517. doi:10.1080/23311975.2023.2300517
Deegan, C. (2020) Financial Accounting. 9th ed. Sydney: McGraw-Hill Education. Prescribed text and the source of the chapter structure used in HI6025 tutorials.
Islam, R., Haque, Z. and Moutushi, R.H. (2022) ‘Earnings quality and financial flexibility: a moderating role of corporate governance’, Cogent Business and Management, 9(1), 2097620. doi:10.1080/23311975.2022.2097620
Holmes Institute (2025) Holmes Institute Adapted Harvard Referencing Guide. Melbourne: Holmes Institute Higher Education. Available through the Study Skills link on Blackboard.
Note on style: Holmes Institute prescribes its own adapted Harvard method for this unit, not APA and not AGLC. Reference lists are numbered, ordered A to Z by author surname, and each entry carries a hyperlink to the full text so that a marker can verify it. In-text citations give author surname, year, page number and paragraph, for example (Islam et al., 2022, p4(2)).
Sample Answer: Reading Remuneration Against Incentives
Fixed remuneration sets the floor of an executive package while short term incentives do the work of directing behaviour, and the ratio between them tells a reader more about risk appetite than the dollar figures do. A typical ASX 200 remuneration report now splits the short term incentive between a financial scorecard weighted to statutory profit or earnings per share and a non financial component covering safety, culture and customer measures. Positive Accounting Theory predicts that where the financial weight dominates, managers face a live incentive to pull revenue or defer costs into the reporting period that determines the payout. Evidence on the manager side of that relationship is tangled, since governance quality moderates how far opportunism runs, and firms with weaker monitoring show measurably worse earnings outcomes (Islam et al., 2022). Long term incentives behave differently because vesting conditions spread across three or four years and often use relative total shareholder return, which shifts attention toward share price rather than toward the income statement. The debt covenant hypothesis then explains why a leveraged company might prefer accounting policies that protect reported equity, and the political cost hypothesis explains why a large, visible company might prefer to defer profit in a year when regulatory attention is high. Reading the two hypotheses against the actual incentive weights converts the report from a summary of a pay table into an argument about behaviour.
Sample Answer: Judgement Where the Standards Leave Room
Two standards offer the clearest evidence of judgement in an Australian annual report, and both sit inside the option list for Part B. AASB 138 gives preparers latitude over the point at which development expenditure moves from research to capitalised development, and that single determination can shift millions between the income statement and the balance sheet. AASB 16 gives preparers latitude over the incremental borrowing rate used to discount lease payments, and a twenty five basis point difference in that rate changes both the right of use asset and the lease liability in ways a reader cannot reconstruct from the face of the statement. Disclosure of ongoing practical expedients and transition relief under the lease standard has been variable across Australian preparers, which is exactly the transparency question Part B asks a group to evaluate (AASB Research Report No. 17, 2022). A defensible answer identifies the disclosure, screenshots the note with a figure number and page reference, and then tests whether the note explains the assumption or merely restates the standard. Screening twenty pages of notes for boilerplate language takes an hour and produces the specific examples the transparency criterion rewards. Groups that skip that step end up paraphrasing the accounting policy note, which earns very little because the policy note is standardised text.
Where Bonus Targets Bite
The bibliometric record on earnings management has grown fast, and the volume matters for a group trying to choose three journal articles that actually speak to each other. A review of that literature traces the field from accrual based measures through real activities manipulation to the current interest in how incentive contracts interact with reporting choices (Bui, 2024). Three moves turn that body of work into usable evidence:
- Select articles that measure accruals or real manipulation in a setting comparable to the allocated company, since small firm evidence from an emerging market may not transfer to an ASX 200 entity.
- Check whether the paper separates the bonus plan hypothesis from the debt covenant hypothesis, because a study that treats all incentives as one variable cannot support a claim about any single hypothesis.
- Cite the specific finding, such as the direction and significance of a coefficient, instead of citing the paper’s general topic.
- Pair each hypothesis with one article and one line from the Remuneration Report, so the paragraph carries both evidentiary legs.
Groups that follow that pattern produce an evaluation a marker can follow line by line, and the 14 marks in Part A reward exactly that structure. Loose citation of literature that was never read closely is easy to spot, because the claim and the article do not match.
Why Descriptive PAT Answers Stall
Students often ask why a group that clearly understands Positive Accounting Theory still lands in the middle bands, and the answer sits in the verb. Defining the three hypotheses earns credit under identification but moves nothing under evaluation. Applying them to the allocated company is where marks accumulate, and applying them means saying which incentive weight produced which accounting choice in which year. Three habits explain most of the gap:
- Writing a paragraph per hypothesis that defines the hypothesis and stops, rather than linking a named incentive to a named policy choice.
- Quoting profit figures without connecting them to the vesting condition that made those figures matter to the executive.
- Treating agency theory as a synonym for Positive Accounting Theory, when the two answer different questions about the same relationship (Al-Faryan, 2024).
Length pressure finishes the job, since 3,000 words disappears quickly when three sections open with a definition. A group that writes the recommendation section first knows what the analysis has to prove, and the drafting then has a target rather than a tour.
Judgement Disclosures Worth Screening
Part B rewards a narrow, evidenced choice over a broad survey, and the screening process is mechanical enough that a group can divide it. Start with the notes that carry the words critical judgements, key estimates or significant assumptions, and shortlist any note tied to one of the four eligible standards. Intangible assets repay the effort because impairment testing under AASB 138 forces a company to disclose discount rates, growth assumptions and the cash generating unit carrying amount, all of which a reader can test for optimism. Leases repay the effort for a different reason, since the incremental borrowing rate and the treatment of options to extend convert a mechanical discount calculation into a judgement with balance sheet consequences. Employee benefits under AASB 119 usually yields the longest assumption table in the report, covering discount rates, salary escalation and mortality, and that table makes boilerplate easy to detect. Whichever pair a group selects, the transparency evaluation should say what a stakeholder cannot reconstruct from the note, because that gap is the finding the marking criterion is looking for.
Closing Note on the Report
Choosing the company early matters more here than in most units, because Part A needs a remuneration report with real incentive detail and Part B needs notes where judgement shows through. Banks and insurers publish long assumption tables but often compress their incentive discussion, while retailers and mining companies tend to do the reverse, so the pair of sections pulls in different directions. Screening three annual reports before registering one is a reasonable use of an afternoon. Allocate Part A and Part B to different members on day one, agree the single reference list format before anyone writes, and keep the screenshots with figure numbers as you go rather than hunting them at the end. Groups that lose marks on presentation almost always lost them on the reference list, not on the argument. Set one internal deadline four days before the Blackboard cut off so the cover page, word count and file format are not the things that cost the group a penalty.
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Executive Remuneration and Professional Judgement in Financial Reporting: A Critical Analysis of Qantas Airways Limited
Assessment Cover Page
Institution: Holmes Institute Higher Education
Faculty: Faculty of Higher Education
Unit: HI6025 Accounting Theory and Current Issues
Program: Master of Professional Accounting
Assessment: Group Assignment
Company: Qantas Airways Limited (ASX: QAN)
Annual Report: 2025
Group Members: [Insert names and student numbers]
Declared Word Count: [Insert final word count]
Executive Summary
Executive remuneration and professional judgement influence the quality of financial reporting and the decisions that managers make on behalf of shareholders. Qantas Airways Limited provides a useful case for examining these relationships through its FY2025 Annual Report. Part A evaluates the company’s fixed remuneration, short-term incentives and long-term incentives using Positive Accounting Theory. The analysis identifies potential earnings management incentives associated with profit-based bonuses, debt arrangements and political exposure, although the available disclosures do not establish that Qantas engaged in opportunistic accounting. Part B examines professional judgement under AASB 16 Leases and AASB 138 Intangible Assets, focusing on lease measurement and software recognition. Although Qantas provides useful information about these accounting treatments, some assumptions remain difficult for external stakeholders to assess independently. The report recommends stronger independent oversight of incentive calculations and more detailed disclosure of significant accounting assumptions.
Introduction
Executive remuneration influences how managers prioritise financial performance, shareholder returns and operational responsibilities. Accounting standards also require professional judgement because managers must interpret contractual conditions, estimate future economic benefits and determine appropriate asset measurements. Qantas Airways Limited illustrates these issues through its remuneration arrangements and financial reporting for the year ended 30 June 2025. Its remuneration framework combines financial and non-financial performance targets, while its financial statements contain significant lease liabilities and intangible assets. The following analysis evaluates whether these arrangements encourage responsible management and whether the company’s disclosures provide sufficient information for financial statement users.
Part A: Executive Remuneration and Positive Accounting Theory
Executive Remuneration Structure
Qantas divides executive remuneration into fixed annual remuneration, a short-term incentive plan (STIP) and a long-term incentive plan (LTIP). Each component serves a different purpose and carries distinct performance conditions.
| Remuneration component | Structure and payment | Performance measures |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed remuneration | Guaranteed annual base pay, inclusive of superannuation, paid in cash. | Market benchmarking, position responsibilities and relevant experience. |
| Short-term incentives | 50% cash and 50% deferred shares, with a two-year restriction on the deferred shares. | Underlying profit before tax, customer satisfaction, employee performance, safety and climate objectives. |
| Long-term incentives | Performance rights that convert into shares upon vesting, followed by a one-year trading restriction. | Three-year relative total shareholder return against global airlines, relative TSR against ASX 100 companies and corporate reputation measured through RepTrak. |
Source: Qantas Airways Limited (2025, pp. 46–47, 49–51).
Fixed remuneration provides executives with a guaranteed income regardless of annual performance. Qantas reviews base pay against comparable Australian listed companies, including ASX 50 organisations. The approach provides some stability while allowing the company to recruit and retain experienced executives.
The STIP provides a more direct connection between annual performance and executive rewards. In FY2024/25, the Group Scorecard assigned 50% to underlying profit before tax, 30% to customer and people measures, 15% to operational and workplace safety, and 5% to climate measures. The CEO and CFO were assessed entirely against the Group Scorecard, whereas other executives also received individual performance assessments. The CEO’s target incentive opportunity was 100% of base pay, compared with 80% for other executive management, with a maximum opportunity of 160% for both groups (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, pp. 42–47).
The LTIP provides a longer assessment period. Its three equally weighted measures consider shareholder returns against two comparison groups and Qantas’ corporate reputation. The 2023–2025 award achieved 100% vesting after Qantas recorded three-year total shareholder returns of 119%, ranking third among 17 global airline peers and eighth against ASX 100 companies (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, pp. 45–46).
Evaluation Through Positive Accounting Theory
Bonus Plan Hypothesis
The bonus plan hypothesis proposes that managers may select accounting policies that increase reported earnings when their remuneration depends on accounting results. Qantas’ STIP creates a relevant incentive because underlying profit before tax accounts for half of its Group Scorecard. The FY2025 scorecard established a threshold of $1.8 billion, a target of $2.125 billion and an overdrive level of $2.45 billion. Qantas reported underlying profit before tax of $2.394 billion, producing an 81% outcome for the financial performance category (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, pp. 3, 42–43).
Such arrangements may encourage managers to protect annual earnings when performance approaches an incentive threshold. Potential responses include delaying discretionary expenditure, accelerating revenue recognition where permitted, or exercising judgement over provisions and asset estimates. These decisions may improve short-term accounting performance without producing equivalent long-term economic benefits. Liu et al. (2026) find that performance targets can influence real earnings management, particularly when a dominant accounting measure creates pressure to meet a bonus threshold.
Qantas partly reduces this risk through non-financial performance measures. Customer satisfaction, workplace safety and climate objectives make it harder for managers to achieve maximum rewards through accounting results alone. Tahir et al. (2019) similarly associate the inclusion of non-financial measures with lower income-increasing earnings manipulation. Nevertheless, the 50% financial weighting remains significant and requires effective oversight of adjustments to underlying profit.
Debt Covenant Hypothesis
The debt covenant hypothesis suggests that managers facing restrictive borrowing conditions may adopt income-increasing accounting choices to avoid breaching financial agreements. Qantas has substantial financing commitments, making its financial position relevant to this hypothesis. At 30 June 2025, the company reported net debt of approximately $5.029 billion and capitalised aircraft lease liabilities of $864 million. Its financial framework targets a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio between 2.0 and 2.5 times and seeks to preserve its investment-grade Baa2 credit rating (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, p. 17).
Management may therefore have an incentive to protect reported financial performance and borrowing capacity. Accounting estimates affecting asset values, depreciation, lease liabilities and earnings could influence some financial ratios used by creditors. However, the annual report does not identify a specific debt covenant violation or disclose covenant headroom. Consequently, the debt covenant hypothesis provides a possible explanation of managerial incentives rather than evidence that Qantas manipulated its accounts.
Pittman and Zhao (2020) find that tighter debt covenant restrictions are associated with a higher probability of financial statement misreporting, particularly where performance covenants apply. Their findings support the need for creditor monitoring and reliable financial reporting. Qantas’ disclosed financial framework suggests that maintaining access to finance remains important, although the available evidence does not establish direct covenant pressure.
Political Cost Hypothesis
The political cost hypothesis predicts that larger and more publicly visible organisations may prefer income-decreasing accounting choices when high reported profits could attract political, regulatory or public scrutiny. Qantas operates in a heavily regulated industry and receives considerable public attention because of its influence on domestic and international travel.
Its FY2025 report records regulatory and legal matters, including a $100 million civil penalty paid to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Further legal provisions were recognised outside underlying profit before tax. Since the STIP relies heavily on underlying profit before tax, excluding certain legal expenses from the performance measure may reduce their direct effect on incentive outcomes. Such exclusions can create concerns about whether the remuneration measure reflects the full economic consequences of management decisions.
The Board’s response to the company’s cybersecurity incident provides a useful example of oversight. It reduced the CEO and executive management Group Scorecard outcome by 15 percentage points, taking the final result from 139% to 124%. The decision recognised the effect of the incident on customers despite favourable financial performance. Jung and Yang (2024) find that political risk is positively associated with income smoothing, suggesting that public and regulatory pressures can influence managerial reporting decisions. Nevertheless, Qantas’ Board adjustment demonstrates that non-financial accountability can reduce some of these incentives.
Shareholder Alignment and Recommendations
Qantas’ remuneration framework provides meaningful shareholder alignment through deferred shares, relative shareholder returns and longer performance periods. However, the substantial short-term profit weighting may encourage managers to favour immediate financial results over investments whose benefits emerge later. Board discretion reduces some risks, although its effectiveness depends on transparent and consistent decisions.
Two improvements could strengthen the arrangement.
First, Qantas should reduce the short-term incentive’s reliance on underlying profit before tax. The financial measure could carry a lower weighting, with greater emphasis on independently measured safety, customer satisfaction and operational performance. The company should also extend the deferred share restriction from two to three years and retain clear provisions for withholding or recovering awards following serious misconduct or failures. The findings of Tahir et al. (2019) and Liu et al. (2026) support the use of multiple performance measures to reduce excessive dependence on a single financial target.
Second, Qantas should strengthen independent review and disclosure of incentive calculations. The remuneration report should provide clearer explanations of adjustments to underlying profit, the treatment of exceptional legal costs and the reasons for exercising Board discretion. Such disclosures would help shareholders determine whether incentive payments reflect sustainable performance rather than favourable accounting adjustments.
Part B: Professional Judgement in Accounting Standards
Professional judgement remains central to applying accounting standards because financial transactions often contain contractual and economic uncertainties that cannot be resolved through mechanical calculations alone. Qantas’ FY2025 disclosures concerning leases and intangible assets illustrate how management decisions influence recognised assets, liabilities and expenses.
AASB 16: Lease Term and Discount Rate Judgements
AASB 16 requires lessees to recognise a right-of-use asset and a corresponding lease liability for most lease arrangements. Paragraph 18 requires management to assess the non-cancellable lease period together with extension and termination options where the relevant conditions are met. Paragraph 26 requires the use of the implicit interest rate when readily determinable, or the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate otherwise (AASB, 2022a).
Qantas leases aircraft, engines, properties and operational equipment. Its accounting policy explains that management considers the economic circumstances of cancellable and renewable contracts when determining lease terms. It also uses an incremental borrowing rate reflecting the rate it would pay to finance an asset of similar value under comparable economic conditions (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, p. 121).
The judgement has material financial consequences because lease duration and discount rates determine the present value of future payments. At 30 June 2025, Qantas reported right-of-use assets of $1.280 billion and lease liabilities of $1.556 billion. Property accounted for $990 million of lease liabilities, while aircraft represented $482 million (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, p. 84).
Figure 1. AASB 16 lease accounting disclosure
[INSERT SCREENSHOT FROM QANTAS ANNUAL REPORT 2025, NOTE 35(I), PAGE 121. ENSURE THE DISCUSSION OF LEASE TERM AND INCREMENTAL BORROWING RATE IS VISIBLE.]
The disclosure explains the accounting methods and identifies the main factors considered when determining lease terms. However, it does not provide a sufficiently detailed breakdown of the incremental borrowing rates applied to the different lease categories or a sensitivity analysis showing how alternative assumptions would affect recognised liabilities. Delgado-Vaquero et al. (2022) identify inconsistent disclosure of incremental borrowing rate information among listed companies, which can reduce comparability between financial statements.
Qantas therefore provides useful information about its lease accounting approach, although stakeholders cannot fully reconstruct the assumptions used in calculating its lease liabilities. Additional disclosure of weighted-average discount rates and significant lease-term assumptions would improve transparency.
AASB 138: Recognition and Measurement of Intangible Assets
AASB 138 requires management to apply judgement when deciding whether expenditure meets the recognition requirements for intangible assets. Paragraph 21 requires probable future economic benefits and reliable measurement of cost. Paragraph 57 establishes additional criteria for recognising internally generated development expenditure, including technical feasibility, intention to complete the asset and the availability of resources (AASB, 2022b).
Qantas applies these principles to software development expenditure. Its accounting policy states that software costs qualify for recognition when the company controls the resulting future economic benefits, those benefits are probable and the expenditure can be measured reliably. Cloud computing arrangements generally receive different treatment because fees for access to a provider’s software are expensed over the service period where no software intangible asset is obtained (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, p. 123).
The distinction requires management to determine whether expenditure creates a separately identifiable asset or merely provides access to an external service. The decision affects current expenses and the value of non-current assets. Qantas reported total intangible assets with a net book value of $598 million in FY2025, including software valued at $100 million after accumulated amortisation and impairment (Qantas Airways Limited, 2025, p. 85).
Figure 2. AASB 138 software recognition and amortisation policy
[INSERT SCREENSHOT FROM QANTAS ANNUAL REPORT 2025, NOTE 35(J), PAGE 123. ENSURE THE SOFTWARE RECOGNITION CRITERIA AND AMORTISATION PERIOD TABLE ARE VISIBLE.]
The company applies straight-line amortisation, with software generally amortised over two to ten years. Goodwill, trademarks and airport landing slots receive indefinite useful lives and undergo annual impairment testing rather than routine amortisation. These classifications require management to estimate the expected period of economic benefit and assess whether an asset’s value remains recoverable.
Qantas provides meaningful information about the recognition criteria, carrying values and amortisation periods. Nevertheless, the disclosure gives limited detail about the individual judgements used to determine which software development costs qualify for capitalisation. Ibrahim et al. (2025) identify differences in intangible asset recognition and disclosure across listed companies, particularly between acquired and internally generated assets. Their findings support greater disclosure about the nature and recognition of intangible resources.
Overall Evaluation of Professional Judgement
Professional judgement plays a central role in applying both standards because management must make estimates that directly affect the financial statements. Under AASB 16, lease duration and incremental borrowing rates influence recognised assets and liabilities. Under AASB 138, decisions about software recognition, useful lives and amortisation influence the timing of expenses and the carrying value of assets.
The two standards establish recognition and measurement requirements, but they cannot remove the need for management estimates. Qantas provides relevant accounting policies and financial figures, although its disclosures do not explain every important assumption in sufficient detail for independent assessment. Greater detail about discount rates, lease-term decisions and software capitalisation would help investors compare financial information across reporting periods and companies.
Consequently, the argument that professional judgement plays a central role in applying accounting standards is supported. The standards establish boundaries for acceptable accounting treatments, while management remains responsible for applying those requirements to the circumstances of individual transactions. Effective audit oversight and transparent disclosures are therefore essential to maintaining the reliability of financial reporting.
Conclusion
Executive remuneration and professional judgement both influence the quality of Qantas’ financial reporting. Its remuneration framework encourages shareholder alignment through long-term incentives and non-financial performance measures, although the substantial weighting assigned to annual profit creates potential pressure for short-term earnings management. The debt covenant and political cost hypotheses also identify possible incentives, but the annual report does not establish that Qantas engaged in opportunistic accounting.
The analysis of AASB 16 and AASB 138 confirms that management estimates influence the measurement of lease liabilities and the recognition of intangible assets. Qantas provides useful information about these treatments, although greater disclosure of significant assumptions would improve transparency. Stronger oversight of remuneration calculations and more detailed accounting disclosures would support better accountability to shareholders and other financial statement users.
References
- Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) (2022a) AASB 16 Leases. Melbourne: Australian Accounting Standards Board. Available at: https://standards.aasb.gov.au/aasb-16-nov-2022
- Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) (2022b) AASB 138 Intangible Assets. Melbourne: Australian Accounting Standards Board. Available at: https://standards.aasb.gov.au/aasb-138-dec-2022
- Delgado-Vaquero, D., Morales-Díaz, J. and Zamora-Ramírez, C. (2022) ‘IFRS 16 incremental borrowing rate: Comparability issues and a methodology proposal for loss given default adjustment’, Accounting in Europe, 19(2), pp. 287–310. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/17449480.2022.2046282
- Ibrahim, S., Bowden, J., Elmarzouky, M. and Al-Kilani, M. (2025) ‘Recognition and disclosure of intangibles under International Financial Reporting Standards’, Abacus, 61(4), pp. 857–896. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.70015
- Jung, T. and Yang, D.G. (2024) ‘Firm-level political risk and income smoothing’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 46, article 107229. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107229
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